Preliminaries
The Solana Labs validator implementation JIT compiles all programs before executing a transaction referencing them. To avoid excess recompilations, the JIT output of frequently used programs is cached.
Historically, this cache had been implemented via ExecutorsCache, whose structure was copied to each new block from its parent, duplicating accounting information and costing an additional recompile for the breadth of any forking events. With the v1.16 release branch, ExecutorsCache was replaced by a new implementation called LoadedPrograms.
The relevant objectives of LoadedPrograms were to make the cached programs view global, and fork-aware, reducing accounting information duplication, and allow transaction execution threads to cooperatively load new programs, preventing JIT compilation conflicts that could cause threads to block each other’s progress. Part of the fork-awareness implementation is keeping track of the effective slot height (the slot where the program becomes active) for each program deployment to detect when a cache entry is invalidated by the on-chain program data being replaced. The cooperative loading strategy maintains usage statistics for each program that has been referenced by another program, including those whose JIT output has been unloaded due to eviction or invalidation to improve eviction performance.
The Bug
For programs deployed with a modern loader, LoadedPrograms is able to use accounting information stored in a program’s on-chain account to look up its most recent deployment slot and use this to calculate the effective slot height. However, for programs deployed with legacy loaders, the deployment slot is not retained in the account, so LoadedPrograms uses a sentinel effective slot height of zero whenever a legacy loader program is encountered.
There is an exception to this rule when an actual deploy instruction is observed, signaling that a program’s bytecode has been replaced. In this case, LoadedPrograms inserts a corresponding entry into its accounting table with a true effective slot height regardless of which loader is used to deploy the program. This entry though, is highly susceptible to eviction since it has never been referenced by a transaction. When this occurs, the JIT output is thrown away and the program’s accounting entry is replaced with one denoting its status as unloaded and retaining the effective slot height.
The next time a transaction references this program, LoadedPrograms rightly requires that it be recompiled due to the unloaded status. When compilation is complete, a new accounting entry is inserted at the program’s effective slot height. On the next iteration through LoadedPrograms‘s main loop, the newly loaded program is now visible and returned for transaction execution. However, in the case of a legacy loader program, the new JIT output is inserted at the sentinel effective slot height of zero. This makes it effectively invisible to LoadedPrograms as the new entry is placed behind the unloaded entry. So every iteration through the mainloop triggers another recompilation of the same program as it always appears to be unloaded. This created a classic infinite loop.
On its own, this would only be sufficient to stall a leader attempting to execute the transaction referencing the affected program. The corresponding block would never be broadcast and the triggering transaction would not be propagated to the rest of the cluster. However, in v1.16 LoadedPrograms did not have the cooperative loading feature implemented, so was not vulnerable to the degenerate case. This allows for the triggering transaction to be packed in a block which is then distributed to the rest of the validators, who then hit the infinite loop during replay. Since at the time of the outage, more than 95% of cluster stake was running 1.17, nearly all validators were stalled on this block. Since everyone was stalled in a recompilation loop, no one was voting and as a result, consensus halted irrecoverably.
The Fix
This bug had been previously identified as the cause of a Devnet outage the previous week. Of the two legacy loaders that could trigger the bug, one (“v1”) was already deploy-disabled and the other (“v2”) was deprecated and scheduled to be deploy-disabled during the v1.18 release cycle. The chosen mitigation was to backport the v2 deploy-disable changes to v1.17, and remove the feature gate, making the “v2” deploy-disabled immediately upon cluster restart. This fix eliminates the ability to create the preconditions required to trigger the bug, which was a simpler resolution. A more complete fix will be included with further improvements to LoadedPrograms and allowed to stabilize with the regular release cycle.
Conclusion
The Solana Mainnet Beta outage on 2024-02-06 was caused by a bug in the LoadedPrograms implementation, which led to an infinite recompilation loop in the JIT cache. The bug was identified as the cause of a previous Devnet outage and was fixed by backporting the v2 deploy-disable changes to v1.17 and removing the feature gate. This fix eliminates the ability to create the preconditions required to trigger the bug, and a more complete fix will be included with further improvements to LoadedPrograms.
FAQs
Q: What caused the Solana Mainnet Beta outage on 2024-02-06?
A: The outage was caused by a bug in the LoadedPrograms implementation, which led to an infinite recompilation loop in the JIT cache.
Q: What was the bug in LoadedPrograms?
A: The bug was that LoadedPrograms used a sentinel effective slot height of zero whenever a legacy loader program was encountered, which led to an infinite recompilation loop.
Q: How was the bug fixed?
A: The bug was fixed by backporting the v2 deploy-disable changes to v1.17 and removing the feature gate, which eliminates the ability to create the preconditions required to trigger the bug.
Q: What is the impact of the bug on the Solana network?
A: The bug caused consensus to halt irrecoverably, resulting in a five-hour outage of the Solana Mainnet Beta.
83% Of Crypto Traders Will Get This WRONG! (AVOID THE LOSS)
